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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA DRAKE, : 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : Case No. 940769-CA 
FHP OF UTAH, and TRANSAMERICA 
INSURANCE CO., : 
Respondents. : Priority No. 
BRIEF OP PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-86 and 63-46B-16. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue is whether the petitioner was within the scope 
and course of employment under the special errand exception to the 
going and coming rule at the time of her automobile accident of 
August 14, 1991* 
This being an appeal from the Industrial Commission's denial 
of Worker's Compensation benefits, the applicable standards of 
review are as follows: 
A. "Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error 
standard is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or 
application of a statutory term." Morton International v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). 
B. The Utah Court of Appeals will change a finding of 
fact of the Industrial Commission "only if it is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." King v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 
P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-45 (1988). 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 
who is injured and the dependents of each 
such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if 
the accident was not purposefully self-
inflicted, shall be paid compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury or 
death, and such amount for medical, nurse and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in the 
case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The 
responsibility for compensation and payment 
of medical, nursing and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral expenses provided 
under this chapter shall be on the employer 
and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by an employee against her 
employer, FHP, for recovery of workers7 compensation benefits. 
The employee, Barbara Drake, was injured an automobile accident 
after she delivered and picked up referrals at her employer's 
branch office in Ogden, Utah. The petitioner argues the injury 
occurred within the scope and course of employment and the 
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employer/respondent denies the injury occurred in the scope and 
course of employment. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Petitioner Barbara Drake filed an application for 
hearing with the Industrial Commission on March 1, 1993, On 
September 20, 1993 a hearing was held before Administrative Law 
Judge Donald George. Ms. Drake testified on behalf of herself 
and the defendant/respondent presented no witnesses. On June 1, 
1994 ALJ George issued his Findings of Fact# Conclusions of Law 
and Order granting Ms. Drake workers' compensation benefits. 
On June 29, 1994 FHP filed a Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission. On July 8, 1994 Ms. Drake filed her 
response in opposition to FHP's Motion for Review. On July 18, 
1994, FHP filed its response to Ms. Drake's response. On 
November 18, 1994 the Industrial Commission granted FHP's Motion 
for Review and reversed ALJ George's ruling that Ms. Drake was 
within the scope and course of employment at the time she was 
injured. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Although the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the 
Petitioner Ms. Drake and awarded her workers' compensation 
benefits, the Industrial Commission reversed the ALJ and denied 
Ms. Drake workers' compensation benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The Petitioner, Barbara Drake, was injured in an 
automobile accident on August 14, 1991. (R. 169). 
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2. At the time of her accident/ Ms. Drake was an employee of 
FHP. (R.170). 
3. Ms. Drake worked in FHP's referral office as a referral 
coordinator. (R. 170). 
4. Referrals are documents which authorize clients of FHP's 
health care system to seek treatment from physicians outside the 
FHP system. (R. 170). 
5. FHP has a shuttle system which delivers referrals to its 
offices throughout the state of Utah. (R. 170). 
6. Referrals were supposed to be processed within forty-
eight hours, but were not being processed within four to five 
days because FHP's shuttle system was not functioning in a timely 
manner. (R. 170). 
7. At the time of the accident, Ms. Drake lived in Ogden, 
Utah and worked in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 170). 
8. Ms. Drake's supervisor Larry Jacobs, asked Ms. Drake, 
since she lived in Ogden and worked in Salt Lake City, if she 
would help process the referrals in a timely fashion by 
delivering referrals to the Ogden office on the way home and 
delivering referrals to the Salt Lake office on the way to work. 
(R. 170-71). 
9. Pursuant to her supervisor's direction she would take 
referrals from her work in Salt Lake City and deliver the Ogden 
FHP branch on her way home. (R. 171). 
10. Ms. Drake would also be given referrals at the Ogden 
office to deliver to Salt Lake City the next morning. (R. 171). 
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11. The purpose of Ms. Drake's delivery of the referrals 
was to expedite the time for processing the referrals. (R. 
171) . 
12. Ms. Drake would travel different routes depending on 
whether she was delivering referrals to the Ogden FHP or going 
directly home. (R. 171). 
13. Ms. Drake would travel on 1-15 if she was delivering 
the referrals because the Ogden FHP was close to the highway. 
(R. 171). 
14. If she was not delivering the referrals, she would take 
highway 1-89. (R. 171). 
15. The route Ms. Drake would take when delivering the 
referrals was a five to six mile deviation from the route she 
would ordinarily take home. (R. 171). 
16. Ms. Drake testified that one of the reasons she agreed 
to deliver the referrals was because, on occasion, she would be 
allowed to leave early from her job in Salt Lake City. (R. 171). 
17. Ms. Drake was a salaried employee whose normal working 
hours were between 8:30 to 5:30. (R. 171). 
18. Ms. Drake testified that she would leave work some days 
as early as 4:45 and as late as 5:00 when delivering referrals 
for FHP. (R. 171). 
19. The delivery of the referrals would often take Ms. 
Drake beyond an eight hour day. (R. 171). 
20. On the day of her accident, Ms. Drake left her office 
at approximately 4:45 or 4:50 p.m. (R. 171). 
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21. She had referrals to deliver to the Ogden FHP office 
that day. (R. 171). 
22. She dropped the referrals off at the Ogden FHP office 
and was given additional referrals to deliver the following 
morning. (R. 172). 
23. These referrals were in her car at the time of the 
accident. (R. 172). 
24. After she dropped off the referrals it was Ms. Drake's 
intent to pick up her children at a day care center near her 
home. (R. 172). 
25. Shortly after leaving the Ogden FHP, in close proximity 
to the FHP building Ms. Drake was severely injured in automobile 
accident. (R. 172). 
26. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge 
of the Utah Industrial Commission on September 20, 1993. (R. 
169.) 
27. At that hearing, Ms. Drake was the sole witness and her 
testimony was unrebutted. (R. 169). 
28. Additional evidence was introduced, a joint medical 
exhibit, affidavits corroborating Ms. Drake's testimony and a map 
of the general area. (R. 169, R. 684). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the time of her automobile accident, Ms. Drake was on a 
special errand for employer. Ms. Drake had just delivered 
medical referrals to her employer's Ogden branch. She made these 
deliveries at the direction of her employer and with her 
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employer's knowledge. The delivery of referrals was not part of 
her regular duties, as Ms. Drake was not a delivery person. FHP, 
the employer in the instant matter, had a separate shuttle system 
which was supposed to deliver the referrals. The Industrial 
Commission's reversal of Judge George's ruling that Ms. Drake was 
on a special errand is, under these facts, unreasonable, 
arbitrary and capricious and warrants reversal. 
At the time Ms. Drake was injured she was within the 
xportal-to-portal' coverage afforded employees under the special 
errand rule. Although Ms. Drake had the intent to pick up her 
children at day care, at the time of her accident she was just 
outside the FHP office and had not yet entered on any 
distinctively personal route. Ms. Drake had not yet had the 
opportunity to leave the scope of her special errand. Therefore, 
Ms. Drake is entitled to compensation for injuries sustained in 
the accident. 
Finally, if the Industrial Commission's finding that the 
delivery of referrals is a regular part of her duties, then her 
accident is still compensable as generally within the scope and 
course of employment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MS. DRAKE'S DELIVERY OF MEDICAL REFERRALS FROM FHP WAS A 
SPECIAL ERRAND FOR HER EMPLOYER. 
The facts surrounding Ms. Drake's employment and her 
resulting accident have never been in dispute. In fact, Ms. 
Drake was the sole witness to testify at the hearing before the 
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Administrative Law Judge of the Utah Industrial Commission. 
Before discussing the merits of this appeal, the petitioner will 
provide a brief background on the standard of review for workers' 
compensation cases. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specified how coverage under 
Utah's Worker's Compensation statute is to be construed. 
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act 
is to protect employees who sustain injuries 
arising out of their employment by affording 
financial security during the resulting 
period of disability. To give effect to that 
purpose, the Act should be liberally 
construed and applied to provide coverage. 
Any doubt respecting the right of 
compensation will be resolved in favor of the 
injured employee. State Tax Commission v. 
Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
It is thus well-established in Utah law that coverage under 
Utah's Worker's Compensation statute is to be construed broadly 
in favor of coverage. When there is discretion, coverage should 
be found. 
More generally, the Petitioner does not contest the Findings 
of Fact set forth in the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge. The Administrative Law Judge, in turn, based his findings 
of fact solely on the testimony of the Petitioner Barbara Drake 
and the documentary evidence contained in the record. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that "[f]actual questions are generally 
regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, 
actions or conditions happening, existing or taking place, as 
well as the subjective, such as state of mind." State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). Because the petitioner is not 
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challenging the Commission's Findings of Fact, she will not 
"marshall" the evidence. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994 (requiring party challenging 
findings of fact to "marshall of the evidence in support of those 
findings . . . " ) . 
Instead, the Petitioner is challenging the legal conclusion 
arrived at by the Industrial Commission, namely that Ms. Drake 
was not within the course and scope of employment under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-45. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
specifically addressed the standard of review to apply to an 
Industrial Commission's determination under Section 35-1-45. 
"Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is 
used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a 
statutory term." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 
581, 588 (Utah 1991). Further, this Court grants "discretion to 
an agency's application of the law to particular facts only when 
*"there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the 
language in question, either expressly made in the statute or 
implied from the statutory language.'" Stokes v. Board of 
Review, 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This Court has 
specifically held that there is no grant of discretion to the 
Industrial Commission in interpreting Section 35-1-45. Id. at 
58. Therefore, the correction-of-error standard of review is 
applicable to the Industrial Commission's determination in the 
instant case. 
The first issue this Court must resolve is whether Ms. 
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Drake's delivery of medical referrals constitutes a "special 
errand" for her employer. 
Generally, "traveling to and from work is not part of the 
employment and is not covered by Workman's Compensation." 
Lundbercr v. Cream 0' Weber/Fed. Dairy Farms Inc., 465 P.2d 175, 
176 (Utah 1970). This rule is known as the "coming and going" 
rule. Cross v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 842 
P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Equally well-established 
is an exception to the "coming and going" rule known as the 
"special errand" or "special mission" rule. Several formulations 
of this rule have been expressed in the case law. An early 
statement of the rule, later adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, 
came from California. In Dimmia v. Workmen's Compensation 
Appeals Board, 495 P.2d 433, 439 (Cal. 1972) (emphasis added) the 
California Supreme Court stated 
that when an employee engages in a special 
activity which is within the course of 
employment, and which is reasonably 
undertaken at the request or invitation of 
the employer, and injury suffered while 
traveling to and from the place of such 
activity is also within the course of 
employment and is compensable. 
Professor Larson has summarized the "special errand" rule in 
several places within his treatise Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Law. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court cited the 
following passage in State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 665 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah 1984). 
An act outside an employee's regular duties 
which is undertaken in good faith to advance 
the employer's interest, whether or not the 
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employee's [sic] own assigned work is thereby 
furthered, is in the course of employment. 
Yet another formulation of the "special errand" rule is 
found i n Larson1 s I i <•.!«•:» I ise. 
[w]hen an employee, having identifiable time 
and space limits on his employment, makes an 
off-premise journey which would normally not 
be covered within the course of employment by 
the fact that the trouble and time of making 
the journey, or the special inconvenience, 
hazard or urgency of making it in the 
particular circumstances, is itself 
sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an 
integral part of the service itself. 
Several Utah decisions have discussed the "special errand" 
rule. See Lundbera v. Cream O'Weber/Fed. Dairy v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) and Cross v. Board 
of Review of industrial Commission. 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App, 
1992x The closest Utah case on poinl i ; State Tax Commission v. 
Industrial Commission,685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984). 
In State Tax Commission, 685 p.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) 
employee of the Utah State Tax Commission wvi; urjurrd i 
automobile accident while driving to a two-month training program 
In. ."i-iill L e t htj L1" i I '«] Ill ill i_.dk lit 1 052. The employee lived and 
worked in Brigham City, Utah, which was approximate! on li itr 
from Salt Lake City. Id. at 1052-53. The training program was 
desigi led t :c ) assist employees implement new procedures at the 
Brigham City office. Id. at 1052. The employee intended in 
submit mileage reimbursement forms, although she never did. Id. 
at *  have been reimbursed for 
mileage. Id. On thf way to her training i n the morning, she i> » 
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injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 1053. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the employee was on a 
special errand when she was injured in the automobile accident. 
Id. at 1055. The Court recognized several factors as important 
to its decision in finding a special errand. First, the fact 
that the employee "embarked on her training program with the 
knowledge and permission" of her employer. Id. at 1054. Second, 
the fact that the employee was entitled to reimbursement for 
mileage. Id. Third, that "[t]he training activity was directly 
related to her job function." Id. at 1054-55. Finally, the 
Court considered the nature of the journey itself, i.e. was it 
especially "onerous, inconvenient and hazardous . . . " Id. at 
1055. 
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the State 
Tax Commission was the closest case on point to Ms. Drake's case 
and ruled that three of the four factors were satisfied. It was 
undisputed that Ms. Drake undertook this activity under the 
express direction of her supervisor. (R. 170-171) Further, 
although Ms. Drake was not given additional compensation for 
mileage or for her extra duties, the ability to leave work early 
on occasion was consideration for her extra effort. (R. 171) The 
delivery of medical referrals was related to her job function s a 
referral coordinator. 
The Commission reversed the ALJ's holding that the delivery 
of medical referrals by Ms. Drake was not outside her regular 
employment duties. (R. 250) This ruling badly misinterprets the 
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I.'ii Kirst, the i *t which — < Commission cites in support 
of its ruling is the fact *-d these 
referrals, average, three times a week. Even assuming the 
Commissi s interpretation of the law is correct, the 
Commission's conclusion does not rortsonably I"I low from the 
undisputed facts. It was undisputed that Ms. Drake's position 
wan th»i of >-\ referral coordinator. (R. 170). Further 
undisputed is the fact that FHP hau n.i 1 11 h y^stent which 
was supposed to deliver the referrals in a timely fashion. (R. 
Ms Di: a) :< • as not a delivery person, she was a 
referral coordinatoi: The Commission':; M H H hismn I I at the 
delivery of referrals by Ms, Drake was a "regular part of her 
cii ities" i t ;ious. 
More importantly, the Commission misinterprets i Ho "special 
errand" rule, That an employee,s activity occur outside the 
employee1"'- i IMJUI-I iiiiiotj i,« M C I M H T a necessary, nor sufficient 
condition as the Commission reasons. Two cases directly 
contradict such a legal conclusion* First, in State Tax 
Commission, > «MIII>1<>Y<M» was to go to the 
training program every day 101 two months. Under the 
Commission's view of the law, this much regularity would preclude 
recovery. 'I MM ' i1 jpteinii L'uut " Sn Lhi.- conclusion. 
Second, in Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 568 P [. 
ct^ App^ 1977j a n employee deposited mone> i :* the bank after work 
every night. The employee :k from the 
bank deposit. The court held that "the historical facts are 
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undisputed, and plaintiff performed a xspecial errand7 every 
working day as a matter of lav." Id. at 235 (emphasis added). 
Similarly in the instant case, Ms. Drake performed a special 
errand every time she delivered and picked up medical referrals 
for her employee FHP. There is no basis in law or reason for 
concluding she was not on a special errand simply because she did 
the errand with some frequency. The "historical facts" in this 
case are undisputed and Ms. Drake was on a special errand as a 
matter of law. See also Dimmicr v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals 
Board. 495 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1972) (employee killed on way home from 
night class on special errand)• 
In the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, FHP 
argued that Lundbera v. Cream O'Weber/Fed. Dairy Farms, Inc.. 465 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1970) and Cross v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) mandated a denial 
of benefits in the instant case. Both cases are distinguishable. 
In Lundbera. 465 P.2d 175 (Utah 1973) an employee was killed on 
his way to work in the morning. Id. at 175. Although the 
employee frequently engaged in special errands in his employment 
as a sales manager, on the particular morning at issue he was 
not. Id. at 175. A meeting had been called at 8:00 a.m. and the 
employee was driving to work at the company offices for the 8:00 
a.m. meeting. Id. at 175. The employee died in an automobile 
accident on the way to this meeting. Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
correctly found that the "going and coming" rule barred 
compensation. Driving to work at your employer's work office for 
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an 8:00 a.m. meeting i s not a speci< 
Conversely, Ms. Drake had just completed a delivery mission 
when (ti. i7i-i72) . She was not driving to work 
the following morning, instead she har vrnial 
course home and made a delivery of essential documents for the 
bene! i • "I IM "i 
In Cross, - T?n? (Utah Ct. App- . < *mp] oy ee 
lived n Tooele, Utah and worked temporary construction site 
ir Utah. Id. a . The employee argued for several 
exceptions to the "going and coming" rule, one of wh ich was I In 
special errand rule. The court disposed of this argument, noting 
that the employee wa> ucl mi >m erraii'.l 1 i his employer, or even 
traveling at his employees direction. [The employee] was merely 
traveling home from work." Id. at 1205. The employee though that 
because he had in Leave J an especially loin) il i s! .irn '<- UP was 
exempted from the "going and coming" rule. 
Again, the facts of this case are distinguishable. Ms. 
Drake was traveling from 
her normal work. In Cross, the employee had not done anything 
extra for his employer, he going home. The Cross case 
would be similar *i *" i ui <ie 1 i vor incrrals, (,') 
did not deviate from her normal route home; and (3) was injured 
while -Iriving to uy from Salt Lake City, uf course, these are 
not the facts of Ms. Drake's case. The * * I o;,«ii-t is 
the State Tax Commission case, and the law of that c ise mandates 
(."i » n t p « n s a l 11 ui I  in I II11 liir'akf' , 
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Another error of law argued by FHP and adopted by the 
Commission is the almost obsessive focus on the fact that Ms. 
Drake had completed her delivery and was leaving, rather than 
going to, the site of the special errand. The Petitioner's 
research has revealed no "special errand" case standing for the 
proposition that an employee leaving the site of a special errand 
is no longer covered. A number of cases that have considered the 
issue hold the contrary. In Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 568 
P.2d 233 (N.M. 1977) the court held that injuries sustained in 
automobile accident while returning from the site of the errand 
to the employee's normal route home were compensable. An 
employee killed on his way home from night classes in Dimmicr v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 495 P.2d 433, 434 (Cal. 
1972) was found to be within the scope of the special errand 
rule. Another employee walking home after the performance of his 
special errand was struck by an automobile at an intersection. 
The court held that he could recover under the special errand 
rule. Jonas v. Lillvbad, 137 N.W. 2d 370 (Minn. 1965). These 
cases all illustrate than an employee is covered while both going 
to and leaving the site of the special errand. The Commission's 
ruling to the contrary is erroneous. 
POINT II 
AT THE TIME MS. DRAKE WAS INJURED, SHE WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
THE SPECIAL ERRAND RULE. 
The Commission found that M[s]ince the accident in question 
occurred as Ms. Drake was driving to the child care center, the 
accident did not arise out of and in the course of her employment 
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«lit id wnuld not be compensable even if she were otherwise on a 
* special errand Commist s the 
law surrounding the special errand rule. 
The special errand rule affords "portal to porta]" coverage 
for employees. 1A Larson, The ion 
Section 16.10 (1978); Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 295 S.E. 
; and Charak v. Leddy, 261 4 86 
(1965) . Ms. Drake was well within the "r 
coverage provided by the special errand rule. 
"I"in ' landmark case in this area is Charak v. Leddy, 26] 
N.Y.S.2d 48 6 (1965). In Charak, an attorney employ ee was aboi it 
to embark a special errand at a local municipal building. Id. 
instances of the accident are described 
the court. 
"Claimant lived in an apartment and her 
accident occurred when she fell on steps 
leading from the inner lobby of the apartment 
house to an outer lobby, from which the inner 
lobby shut off by a door, which as kept 
locked, and which claimant had not yet 
reached." Id. 
The C'MHI i i l i ' i i i i i l t nn ipc i i ib j l i i u i ivi\ I I I 1 ! 
A fall in her apartment would not have given 
rise to any claim. If, however, in the 
performance of a special errand, she had 
fallen on the street, barely beyond the outer 
door of the building, the accident would have 
been compensable, even though she had not 
deviated from her usual route to work Id. 
xc was the Charak court that initially coined the term, 
"portal to portal" cowt dqv , l.d.. «»• 'l" "' I " ' M^'.- • .f f h j s 
nature employees enjoy portal-to-portal coverage ) The 
-• 17 -
Charak "portal to portal" concept has formed the basis of any 
analysis focusing on when an employee is within the scope of the 
special errand rule. See Safeway Stores v. Workers' 
Compensation, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) and Powers 
v. Lady's Funeral Home, 295 S.E.2d 473 (N.C. 1982). 
The application of this concept to Ms. Drake's case shows 
that she was well within the "portal to portal" coverage afforded 
by the special errand rule. One court has discussed its approach 
in analyzing whether an employee is within the scope of the 
special errand rule. 
We cannot agree to the *bright line' rule 
adopted by the Commission in determining when 
a special errand commences. Although such 
rule does have the attribute of certainty, it 
cannot be obtained at the expense of justice. 
In deciding questions about when a special 
errand begins or ends, each case must be 
determined upon its particular fact 
situation. No exact formula can be laid down 
which will automatically solve every case. 
Felton v. Hospital Guild. 291 S.E.2d 158, 159 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) 
The facts of these out-of-state cases are illustrative and 
support a finding that Ms. Drake was within the scope of the 
special errand rule when she was injured. In Charak v. Leddv, 
261 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1965) an employee was denied compensation 
because she fell in the inner lobby of her apartment building on 
the way to a special errand. The court stated that if she had 
fallen "barely beyond the outer door of the building, the 
accident would have been compensable . . . " Id. at 487. In 
Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville, 291 S.E.2d 158 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1982) affd in 296 S.E.2d (N.C. 1982), an employee slipped 
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ii in her driveway on the way to a special errand. Id. at 
159. The court held that I,line p h i i n t i f J IHHI I i|un lu-ii s p e c i a l 
errand on behalf of her employer. She had left the safety of her 
hoi ise and 1: iad entered into the hazards of her journey '* ,'\, s 
160. Again in Powers v. Ladv/s Funeral Home, J 
(N.C. 1982), employee was injured after he had completed a 
"II^M.TJI ri' m he parked his car and the car rolled down an 
incline and hit him just as he was 
Id. at 4 75, 
"I I I I I In in rasrs accurately and thoughtfully apply the 
"portal to portal" concept to the special errand rtiU*. n in alee 
is well within the portal to portal coverage provided by the 
if' i l i e ' r- dropped off the documents 
to be delivered. urther, she had picked up 1 lie 
documents to deliver the next morning. (R. 172). Her accident 
occurred approximate!\ w i t h i n our mil of liie PUP center. (R. 
684) The FHP center was a five mile deviation from her normal 
route home. (R. 684). Hence, Ms. Drake simply was still within 
the realm n-f her sp d. 
The defendant ; Commission makes much of the fact that 
Ms. Drake had thr intent to pick up her children at a day care 
center. They re. " ' overage of 
her special errand. First, she had not deviated from the route 
required oi her special errand, as her day care center is in the 
same general vicinity as her home 
"troubling" hypotheticals can be posed, this Court may only 
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decide the facts of the case before it. Ms. Drake simply had not 
made it far enough to escape the special errand. The accident 
occurred right by the Ogden FHP center. 
Under the facts of this case, Ms. Drake was well with the 
portal to portal coverage provided by the special errand rule. 
She was beyond her front door, Powers, 295 S.E.2d at 474, and 
beyond her driveway, Felton, 291 So.2d 158, which were recognized 
as within the scope of the special errand. Ms. Drake was 
virtually adjacent to the site of her special errand. The 
Industrial Commission seized on the fact that she intended to 
pick up her children at day care as an opportunity to deny her 
coverage. However, Utah's Worker's Compensation laws are to be 
liberally construed in favor of coverage of the employee. Askren 
v. Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah 1964). Ms. 
Drake asks this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's 
conclusions of law as clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner Barbara Drake asks this Court to reverse the 
Industrial Commission's order denying her worker's compensation 
benefits. Petitioner asks that this Court affirm the 
Administrative Law Judge's ruling that Ms. Drake was on a special 
errand at the time of her automobile accident. 
DATED this ^Q day of ^ M w ^ / 1995. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
S R. HASENYAGER 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
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